Associate Professor
Resume
Laurent A. Mathevet
Address:1130 E. Helen Street,
McClelland Hall 401S
Tucson, Arizona 85721
Email:lmathevet@arizona.edu
Phone:520-621-4264
BIO
Laurent Mathevet is an Associate Professor at Eller College of Management, University of Arizona. He earned his Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology and his B.S. from the Université de Saint-Étienne, France. Before joining Eller, he was a faculty member at the European University Institute, New York University, and the University of Texas at Austin.
His research is in economic theory with a focus on incentive design and incomplete information. What started as two separate interests evolved into one: the design of incentives through information or information design. In environments where individuals have incomplete information about relevant parameters, information can be used to affect their behavior. Instead of the traditional (often monetary) incentive systems based on rewards and punishments, such as contracts, taxes & subsidies, etc., an informational advantage can be used to incentivize certain behaviors. Marketing, political campaigns, school grading systems, real-time road navigation advice, and even informal conversations are acts of disclosure often carried out with an intention. Information design is the systematic study of how to strategically disclose information under commitment. Prof. Mathevet’s research has explored the theoretical foundations of information design, its behavioral implications, and its organizational structure.
Research
IN PROGRESS
“Reputation and Information Design” (with David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti).
R&R Journal of Political Economy. (Codes & Simulations).
“Organized Information Transmission” (with Ina Taneva).
“Mining The Long Run in Repeated Games” (with Christos Ioannou, Julian Romero, and Huanren Zhang).
Coming soon.
“Simplifying Bayesian Persuasion” (with Elliot Lipnowski).
PUBLICATIONS
“Optimal Attention Management: A Tractable Framework” (with Elliot Lipnowski and Dong Wei)
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 133, 2022, 170-180.
“Attention Management” (with Elliot Lipnowski and Dong Wei)
American Economic Review: Insights, vol. 2 (1), 2020.
“On Information Design in Games” (with Jacopo Perego and Ina Taneva)
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 128 (4), 2020.
“Disclosure to a Psychological Audience” (with Elliot Lipnowski)
AEJ: Microeconomics, vol. 10 (4), 2018, 67-93.
“An Axiomatization of Plays in Repeated Games”
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 110, 2018, 19-31. (Supplementary Material)
“Beliefs and Rationalizability in Games with Complementarities”
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 85, 2014, 252-271.
“Tractable Dynamic Global Games and Applications” (with Jakub Steiner)
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 148, 2013, 2583-2619.
“Finite Supermodular Design with Interdependent Valuations” (with Ina Taneva)
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 82, 2013, 327–349.
“Designing Stable Mechanisms in Economic Environments” (with Paul J. Healy)
Theoretical Economics, vol. 7 (3), 2012, 609-443.
“A Contraction Principle for Finite Global Games”
Economic Theory, vol. 42 (3), 2010, 539-563.
“Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes” (with Matthew O. Jackson and Kyle Mattes)
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, vol. 2 (1), 2007, 67-94.
“Multiplicity of Equilibria and Information Structures in Empirical Games” (with multiple co-authors)
Marketing Letters, 2014.
Curriculum
EDUCATION
Ph.D in Social Sciences
California Institute of Technology, 2008
M.S. in Social Sciences
California Institute of Technology, 2005
B.S. in Economics
Université de Saint-Etienne, 2003
EMPLOYMENT
Associate Professor
Department of Economics, University of Arizona. 2024 – present
Professor
Department of Economics, European University Institute. 2021 – 2024
Assistant Professor
Department of Economics, New York University. 2013 – 2021
Assistant Professor
Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin. 2008 – 2013