Laurent Mathevet is an Assistant Professor in the department of Economics at New York University. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. from the California Institute of Technology and a B.S. from the Universite of Saint-Etienne, France. Before joining NYU, he taught at the University of Texas at Austin.
The focus of his research has been game theory, mechanism design, and recently information design. In social situations requiring a group to make a decision, the procedures for decision-making can have profound effects on the outcome (for example, voting procedures can affect who is elected, and how we sell a good can change how much revenue is raised). Mechanism design investigates what kind of procedures provide incentives that lead to favorable social outcomes. Prof. Mathevet has proposed systems that are robust to the participants’ mistakes, and he has also worked on equilibrium multiplicity in games with incomplete information.
His current research includes the study of behaviors in repeated interactions and information design. Information design investigates how to design incentives through information disclosure. Suppose, for example, that you are a well-intentioned advisor (like a doctor, a parent, etc.). Should you always reveal the whole truth (to your patient, your child, etc.)? In general, if you knew something that a group of people did not, how could you use this information to incentivize them to do something? Prof. Mathevet and his co-authors answer the first question in a paper entitled “Disclosure to a Psychological Audience,” and they propose an approach for dealing with the latter in “Information Design: The Belief-Hierarchy Approach."
New York University, Department of Economics,
19 W. 4th St, 6FL, New York, NY 10012.
Phone: (212) 998 8934
New York University
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
"Beliefs and Rationalizability in Games with Complementarities", Games and Economic Behavior, volume 85, 2014, 252-271.
"Tractable Dynamic Global Games and Applications", (with Jakub Steiner), Journal of Economic Theory, volume 148, 2013, 2583-2619.
"Finite Supermodular Design with Interdependent Valuations", (with Ina Taneva), Games and Economic Behavior, volume 82, November 2013, 327–349.
"Designing Stable Mechanisms in Economic Environments", (with Paul J. Healy), Theoretical Economics, volume 7 (3), 2012, 609-443.
"Supermodular Mechanism Design", Theoretical Economics, volume 5 (3), 2010, 403-443.
"A Contraction Principle for Finite Global Games", Economic Theory, volume 42 (3), 2010, 539-563.
"Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes", (with Matthew O. Jackson and Kyle Mattes), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, volume 42 (3), 2010, 539-563.
"Multiplicity of Equilibria and Information Structures in Empirical Games", with multiple co-authors (Brett Gordon, Paul Ellickson and Ron Borkovsky were the principal organizers), Marketing Letters, 2014.
"Disclosure to a Psychological Audience" (click here), (with Elliot Lipnowski), July 2016.
"Information Design: The Belief-Hierarchy Approach", (with Jacopo Perego and Ina Taneva), June 2016.
"An Axiomatization of Plays in Repeated Games", R&R Games and Economic Behavior, July 2016.
(Some supplementary material is available).
"Predictive Repeated Game Theory: Measures and Experiments", (with Julian Romero), November 2014.
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